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an expected negative result . J"\ There are comedy considerations , of course, but 
have they not been fully served? The Virginia court has now stated its position 
on the instruction issue and it has stated its p osition on the seizure issue, although 
the fo r mer was not i n Franci sco ' s case. What , therefore , is to be gained by going 
back to the State s i de? There will be little injury a s between the two systems. 
Th ere is no factual dispute here. Eve ryone knows what the facts are . 
Dick poin ts out that there a re possibly two con si de r a tion s l u rking i n the 
background. Th e one i s whether the ins truct ion was h a rmle ss err or. This does 
not impress me , for I do not see how it could be harmless . The other i s w h ether 
the Sharp decis i on wa s retroactiv e. We a re talking her e about federa l law , 
h owever. Yet the Virginia court's attitude on retroactivity of Sharp is not easily 
ascertained. There are indications that the Virginia would deny a relief in pre-
Sharp cases. 
Dick outlines very well the opposin g c onsidera tions, and the varying 
decisions i n the courts of appeals, regarding the d e rivative exhaustion theory. 
Here, for what it is worth, it is to be noted that the two claims are really totally 
unrelated. If we get bogged down in procedural niceties, an astute attorney can 
avoid all this log jam by dividing his client's claims into separate petitions. 
This would a void the difficulty. 
In summary, the case holds the possibility of our getting terrifica lly 
involved in procedure. I think I am inclined, despite my wonder about counsel's 
impracticality, to the view that the Roberts case controls this one. This means 
that the federal district court should decide the jury instruction issue, and should 
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do so on th 
. e ground that that issue had been exhausted on the State aiilo. This 
is really a questionable ultimate conclusion because it scC!rns fairly apparent 
that the Virginia court might grant relief. Nevertheless, the Virginia court 
has already once ruled, and Roberts is controlling. (What, perhaps, I am 
saying here is that if this case came up without Roberts in the backgrourd, 1 
would be inclined to adopt the position taken by Justice Harlan in the Roberts 
case. But Roberts is on the books , and we may follow it as established law.) 
This would be an end to the case. 
If, however, we are driven to the secondary issue and desire to speay 
of and pass upon derivative exhaustion (as we would if we, for some reason, 
were to hold that Roberts was not controlling), then I think I would be inclined 
t o rule against the doctrine of derivative exhaustion. At least in this case I 
would be willing to hold that he need not exhaust the jury instruction issue on 
the State side. The seizure issue bas been fully exhausted, and I would let the 
federal court pass upon that issue and, while so doing, pass upon the other one 
as well . This, it seems to me, saves time for everyone concerned in the long 
run. Otherwise, we are going to be confronted with separate petitions where 
one would do. 
Thus, my inclination is to reverse and to do so following Roberts. 
H. A. B. 
9/25/74 
